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I. Introduction 
On February 24, 2011, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement agents arrested Nicolas Carpio-Leon because he had 
two firearms in his home’s master bedroom.1 Nicolas had not shot 
or harmed anyone with his guns.2 Rather, federal agents arrested 
him due to the convergence of two circumstances in his life: 
(1) Nicolas lacked legal status, and (2) Nicolas owned firearms.3 
For many U.S. residents, gun ownership is the norm.4 In 1986, 
however, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5),5 colloquially 
known as the federal alien-in-possession statute, which makes it 
unlawful for an undocumented resident to possess a firearm.6 For 
Nicolas, his undocumented status made him an exception to the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms.7 
                                                                                                     
 1. See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 976 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(describing the consensual search of Carpio-Leon’s home, which led to his arrest 
after Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents recovered a rifle and pistol 
in his master bedroom), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 58 (2013). 
 2. See id. (discussing the charge as unlawful possession rather than 
unlawful use of the firearm).  
 3. See id. (noting that Nicolas was charged with “possession of a firearm 
by an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(5)(A)”). 
 4. See One in Three Americans Own Guns; Culture a Factor, Study Finds, 
NBC NEWS (June 29, 2015, 7:09 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/one-three-americans-own-guns-culture-factor-study-finds-n384031 (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2016) (“A new study aimed at figuring out who owns gun in the 
United States and why suggests that about a third of Americans have at least 
one.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (2012). 
 6. See id. (providing in part that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . 
being an alien . . . illegally or unlawfully in the United States . . . to ship or 
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, 
any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition”). Congress 
passed 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968. Id. 
 7. See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 976 (4th Cir. 2012) 
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Nicolas and his wife lived in Orangeburg, South Carolina, for 
thirteen years before his arrest.8 While residing in the United 
States, they had three children, regularly filed income tax 
returns, and did not have  criminal records.9 Indeed, the firearms 
found in Nicolas’s home were the sort owned by many Americans 
to protect their homes and families.10 Nevertheless, a Fourth 
Circuit panel reviewing his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) 
determined as a threshold matter that Nicolas, as an “illegal 
alien,” does “not fall in the class of persons for the purpose of 
defining the Second Amendment’s scope.”11  
The Second Amendment provides, “A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”12 At the 
heart of the debate over alienage and the Second Amendment is 
conflict over the meaning of “the people” contemplated by the 
Second Amendment.13 The phrase “the people” also appears in 
the First,14 Fourth,15 Ninth,16 and Tenth Amendments.17 The 
                                                                                                     
(“[T]he scope of the Second Amendment does not extend to provide protection to 
illegal aliens, because illegal aliens are not law-abiding members of the political 
community and . . . have no more rights under the Second Amendment than do 
aliens outside of the United States seeking admittance.”). 
 8. See id. (discussing the facts presented by Carpio-Leon at the hearing on 
his motion to dismiss).  
 9. See id. (recounting the evidence that Carpio-Leon presented at the 
motion to dismiss hearing to prove these assertions).  
 10. See id. (noting that Carpio-Leon owned a .22 caliber and a 9mm pistol).  
 11. Id. at 981.  
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 13. See infra Part IV (explaining that differing interpretations of “the 
people” has split the circuits).  
 14. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”).  
 15.  See id. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
 16.  See id. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.”). 
 17. See id. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.”). 
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Supreme Court has noted that the phrase “the people” is a “term 
of art” employed selectively throughout the Constitution to 
specify to whom certain rights and privileges apply.18 
Undocumented persons19 have been considered part of “the 
people” for purposes of the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Amendments.20 For example, the government may not censor 
undocumented persons’ free expression,21 may not conduct 
unreasonable searches and seizures of undocumented persons,22 
and may not abrogate the rights and privileges reserved to 
undocumented persons under the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments.23 Furthermore, it is settled law that the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee due process of law 
                                                                                                     
 18. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) 
(noting that the term applies to persons who are considered part of the national 
community).  
 19. When possible, this Note will use terms such as “undocumented 
persons,” “unauthorized persons,” or “undocumented immigrants” to refer to 
those persons dubbed “illegal aliens” by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). It seems prudent 
during academic discussion to avoid using the term “illegal alien,” which has 
potentially pejorative and inflammatory implications. See Pratheepan 
Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right 
to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1523 n.11 (2010) (suggesting that the 
term “alien” may connote “the assumed foreignness and difference of otherwise 
law-abiding persons living in the United States”); Gerald M. Rosberg, The 
Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 
1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 303 (1977) (“The very word, ‘alien,’ calls to mind 
someone strange and out of place, and it has often been used in a distinctly 
pejorative way.”). 
 20. See infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text (mentioning the 
application of the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments to noncitizens).  
 21. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 149 (1945) (determining that 
resident aliens are part of “the people” of the First Amendment).  
 22. See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 
‘[T]he people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the 
First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are 
reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of 
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise 
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered 
part of that community. 
See generally INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (presuming that 
undocumented persons present in the United States have Fourth Amendment 
rights).  
 23. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1982) (finding that the 
Equal Protection Clause applies to undocumented immigrants).  
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to undocumented persons.24 The Supreme Court has reasoned, 
“Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is 
surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term.”25  
As a general rule, the Supreme Court has noted that “aliens 
receive constitutional protections when they have come within 
the territory of the United States and developed substantial 
connections with this country.”26 Despite the recognition that 
undocumented persons may qualify as “the people” throughout 
the Bill of Rights, the meaning of “the people” in the Second 
Amendment specifically has created significant friction.27  
The paradox is striking: the prevailing view amongst the 
federal circuits posits that undocumented persons are part of “the 
people” for purposes of the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Amendments but not for purposes of the Second Amendment. As 
                                                                                                     
 24. See id. at 215 (concluding that “the illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in 
these cases may claim the benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of 
equal protection”); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976)  
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the 
United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth 
Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Even one 
whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory 
is entitled to that constitutional protection.  
Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903)  
[I]t is not competent for the Secretary of the Treasury or any 
executive officer, at any time within the year limited by the statute, 
arbitrarily to cause an alien who has entered the country, and has 
become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its 
population, although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into 
custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard 
upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United 
States. No such arbitrary power can exist where the principles 
involved in due process of law are recognized.  
Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S. 223, 238 (1896)  
Applying this reasoning to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it must 
be concluded that all persons within the territory of the United States 
are entitled to the protection guaranteed by those amendments, and 
that even aliens shall not be held to answer for a capital or other 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand 
jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law.  
 25. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210. 
 26. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).  
 27. See infra Part III (discussing the disagreement among the federal 
circuits on this issue).  
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this Note discusses, the prevailing interpretation of “the people” 
excludes Nicolas Carpio-Leon—as well as millions of other 
similarly situated individuals28—from invoking Second 
Amendment protection to challenge the constitutionality of the 
federal alien-in-possession statute.29 As of late, however, the 
prevailing view has been challenged.30  
A circuit split has developed over the meaning of “the people” 
in the Second Amendment.31 The disagreement centers on 
whether undocumented persons are part of “the people” protected 
by the Second Amendment right to bear arms.32 According to the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, the Second Amendment does 
not afford undocumented persons the right to purchase or possess 
firearms.33 The Seventh Circuit, however, has articulated a more 
nuanced view, whereby undocumented immigrants may 
conceivably have Second Amendment rights, contingent on a 
showing of “substantial connections” to this nation.34 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Portillo-Munoz35 to exclude undocumented persons from “the 
                                                                                                     
 28. See Jeffrey S. Passel & D’vera Cohn, Unauthorized Immigrant 
Population Stable for Half a Decade, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 22, 2015), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/22/unauthorized-immigrant-
population-stable-for-half-a-decade/ (last updated Sept. 21, 2016) (last visited 
Dec. 5, 2016) (“An estimated 11.1 million unauthorized immigrants lived in the 
U.S. in 2014, according to a new preliminary Pew Research Center estimate 
based on government data.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
see also Elizabeth M. Grieco, The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 
2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 2012), https://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/acs-
19.pdf (estimating that approximately 22.48 million noncitizens reside in the United 
States, which comprises 7.3% of the population). 
 29. See infra Part III.A (explaining that the prevailing view in the federal 
circuits excludes undocumented persons from “the people” protected in the 
Second Amendment).  
 30. See infra Part III.B (explaining how the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Meza-Rodriguez departs from the prevailing view).  
 31. See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 672 n.1 (7th Cir. 
2015) (specifying that the decision created a split between the Seventh Circuit 
and the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits).  
 32. See infra Parts III.A–B (contrasting the legal reasoning and 
corresponding conclusions, which have led to the circuit split). 
 33. See infra Part III.A (discussing one side of the circuit split).  
 34. See infra Part III.B (detailing the Seventh Circuit’s holding and 
reasoning). 
 35. 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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people” of the Second Amendment has serious implications for 
the meaning of “the people” throughout the Bill of Rights.36 If 
undocumented persons categorically do not qualify as “the people” 
for Second Amendment purposes, then the door is wide open to 
strip them of other protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.37 
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit panel in Portillo-Munoz specifically 
questioned whether persons illegally present in the United States 
should have Fourth Amendment rights.38 In the wake of 
Portillo-Munoz, some commentators have suggested that 
undocumented immigrants should not qualify as part of “the 
people” for purposes of the entire Bill of Rights.39 One 
                                                                                                     
 36. See Gerard N. Magliocca, The Bill of Rights and Illegal Immigrants, 
BALKINIZATION (June 16, 2011, 9:04 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/06/bill-
of-rights-and-illegal-immigrants.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2016) (expressing fear 
that a narrow reading of “the people” threatens the current interpretation of 
other amendments containing the phrase “the people”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 37. See id. (“Since the term ‘people’ is also used in the First, Fourth, and 
Ninth Amendments, [the Portillo-Munoz] decision has sweeping implications.”); 
see also United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s reasoning renders [persons like 
Portillo-Munoz] vulnerable—to governmental intrusions on their homes and 
persons, as well as interference with their rights to assemble and petition the 
government for redress of grievances—with no recourse.”); Karen N. Moore, 
Aliens and the Constitution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 801, 844 (2013) (“The 
jurisprudence surrounding whether and to what extent Second Amendment 
rights extend to aliens will thus continue to evolve and take shape in the coming 
years.”).  
 38. See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440 (“[N]either this court nor the 
Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment extends to a native and 
citizen of another nation who entered and remained in the United States 
illegally.”); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU Foundation in Support of 
Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1–3, Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d 437 (No. 
11-10086) (“In rejecting Appellant’s claim, the majority panel opinion questions 
whether the Fourth Amendment, which also refers to the right of ‘the people,’ 
should apply to searches and seizures of a ‘native and citizen of another nation 
who entered and remained in the United States illegally.’”); Recent Case, United 
States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011), 125 HARV. L. REV. 835, 
841 (2012) [hereinafetr Recent Case] (“[The court in Portillo-Munoz] inaccurately 
represents the unresolved nature of this issue to say that the Supreme Court 
has never held that the Fourth Amendment applies to undocumented 
immigrants.”).  
 39. See, e.g., Olesya A. Salnikova, Comment, “The People” of Heller and 
Their Politics: Whether Illegal Aliens Should Have the Right to Bear Arms After 
United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 627 (2013) 
(“Heller explicitly extended its reading of ‘the people’ to the other amendments, 
thereby excluding illegal aliens from membership in ‘the people’ across the Bill 
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commentator has even suggested that the Portillo-Munoz court 
should have taken the next logical step to extend the restrictive 
definition of “the people” to other constitutional amendments.40 If 
such views continue to gain acceptance, millions of persons 
unlawfully present in the United States would effectively become 
“non-persons,” vulnerable to unreasonable searches and seizures 
and other government abuses.41 If courts have erroneously 
concluded that “the people” of the Second Amendment excludes 
undocumented immigrants, then it is imperative to unhinge the 
argument before courts apply that flawed reasoning to exclude 
undocumented persons from other protections guaranteed by the 
Bill of Rights.42 Therefore, resolution of the circuit split regarding 
the meaning of “the people” in the Second Amendment is crucial 
to preserve the rights historically afforded to undocumented 
immigrants through the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Amendments.43  
This Note proceeds on the following course: Part II lays the 
necessary foundation to understand the debate over the scope of 
“the people” contemplated by the Second Amendment. Part III 
discusses the circuit split that has developed over whether 
undocumented persons are part of “the people” protected by the 
Second Amendment. Part IV offers three main critiques of the 
“Restrictive View” held by the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, 
                                                                                                     
of Rights. Illegal aliens are not part of ‘the people’ for the purposes of the . . . Bill 
of Rights guarantees generally . . . .”). 
 40. See id. (“Portillo-Munoz’s refusal to extend Heller’s definition of ‘the 
people’ to other constitutional amendments, however, is misplaced.”).  
 41. See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (noting that undocumented persons will have no 
recourse against government abuses); accord Mathilda McGee-Tubb, Comment, 
Sometimes You’re in, Sometimes You’re out: Undocumented Immigrants and the 
Fifth Circuit’s Definition of “The People” in United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 53 
B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 75, 84 (2012) (“Portillo-Munoz opens the door for arbitrary 
classifications of constitutional rights to achieve exclusions that may not 
otherwise have a basis in precedent.”).  
 42. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Noncitizen Participation in the American 
Polity: Guns and Membership in the American Polity, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 619, 653 (2012) (“[J]udicial limitations on ‘the people,’ and the continued 
existence of immigrant gun restrictions suggest that we will resist noncitizen 
inclusion and participation in the polity.”). 
 43. See Salnikova, supra note 39, at 626 (stressing the importance of 
solidifying the meaning of “the people” in the Second Amendment because it 
informs the scope of other constitutionally protected rights).  
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namely that: (1) those courts have conflated the two relevant 
issues, causing them to improperly narrow the scope of “the 
people” to exclude undocumented persons; (2) those courts have 
also relied too heavily on dicta from the Supreme Court’s decision 
in District of Columbia v. Heller44 to justify a narrow reading of 
“the people” in the Second Amendment; and (3) the Fifth Circuit 
in particular erred by relying on an arbitrary distinction between 
the Second and Fourth Amendments to conclude that the Second 
Amendment excludes undocumented persons. Part V 
recommends resolving the circuit split by reading “the people” of 
the Second Amendment consistently with “the people” of the 
Fourth Amendment.45 Also, this Note recommends that courts 
apply the “substantial connections” test—in the same way courts 
currently apply that test to interpret “the people” in the Fourth 
Amendment—to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a 
specific undocumented person qualifies as part of “the people” for 
Second Amendment purposes.  
II. “The People” Contemplated in the Bill of Rights 
The Second Amendment provides, “A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”46 Despite 
                                                                                                     
 44. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
 45. Scholars have expended extensive textual and historical analyses to 
uncover the meaning of “the people” and to determine whether the Second 
Amendment embodies an individual or collective right. See generally, e.g., DAVID 
E. YOUNG, THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1787–1792 (1995); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a 
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991); Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth 
Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2006); David Gray, 
Dangerous Dicta, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1181 (2015); William Michael 
Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and 
the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487 (2007); Eugene Volokh, 
The Amazing Vanishing Second Amendment, 723 N.Y.U. L. REV. 831 (1998); 
David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional 
Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588 (2000); Note, The Meaning(s) of “The People” in 
the Constitution, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1078 (2013). This Note does not aim to 
contribute directly to those inquiries. Rather, this Note focuses on alienage in 
the context of “the people” of the Second Amendment by recommending a 
comprehensive approach to resolve the circuit split over the orientation of 
undocumented persons to the Second Amendment.  
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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the amendment’s brevity, its words do not offer a clear meaning.47 
For years, the contours of this right have remained elusive.48 The 
Supreme Court endeavored to clarify the Second Amendment’s 
ambiguity when it confronted a challenge to the D.C. handgun 
ban in its landmark case, District of Columbia v. Heller.49 In 
Heller, the Court held that the Second Amendment confers an 
individual right to own guns for the lawful purpose of self-defense 
rather than solely a collective right necessarily connected to 
militia service.50 Despite the Court’s textual and historical 
analysis in Heller, many unresolved ambiguities surrounding the 
Second Amendment remained, including the extent to which the 
government may regulate the right.51 More importantly for the 
                                                                                                     
 47. See Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 
TENN. L. REV. 461, 464 (1995) (explaining that the somewhat archaic terms used 
in the Second Amendment are relatively unfamiliar and unclear to the modern 
reader); Dorothy J. Hernaez, Note, Parker v. District of Columbia: 
Understanding the Broader Implications for the Future of Gun Control, 6 GEO. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 693, 696 (2008) (describing the Second Amendment as “the 
most cryptic and debatable provision in the Bill of Rights”).  
 48. See Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms After District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 353 (2009) (noting that United 
States v. Miller, the seminal Second Amendment case, was “an opaque and 
open-ended opinion that left a great deal of ambiguity concerning the nature of 
its holding and its conception of the Second Amendment right”).  
 49. See 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008) (explaining that D.C. Code 
§§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), and 7-2502.02(a)(4) amounted to an absolute ban 
on handguns).  
 50. See id. at 595 (emphasizing the individualized nature of the right and 
thereby expanding the scope of the right beyond an organized, governmental 
context). The Court also held that the city’s handgun ban and the trigger-lock 
requirement (as applied to self-defense) both run afoul of this individual right to 
bear arms. Id. at 629.  
 51. See id. at 665 (“[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first in-depth 
examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the 
entire field . . . .”); United States v. Boffil-Rivera, No. 08-20437-CR, 2008 WL 
8853354, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2008) (“The Court left open for another day 
the extent to which government could enact statutes ‘regulating’ the right to 
bear arms, other than to reaffirm that ‘the right was not unlimited, just as the 
First Amendment’s right of free speech was not . . . .’” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. 
at 2799)), aff’d, 607 F.3d 736 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Lindsay Colvin, Note, 
History, Heller, and High-Capacity Magazines: What Is the Proper Standard of 
Review for Second Amendment Challenges?, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1043 
(2014) (“The proper analytical framework for statutes challenged as an 
unconstitutional infringement on individual Second Amendment rights 
after District of Columbia v. Heller has emerged as both a hotly contested and 
imprecise zone of jurisprudence for lower courts.”).  
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purposes of this Note, the Court did not answer who is included 
in “the people” of the Second Amendment.52 
In 1968, Congress passed the Gun Control Act53 for the 
purpose of “establishing a federal scheme” to govern the 
“distribution of firearms.”54 As part of the scheme, Congress 
barred certain categories of persons from possessing firearms.55 
In 1986, Congress amended the Gun Control Act to include 
§ 922(g)(5), prohibiting an “alien” unlawfully present in the 
United States from possessing a firearm.56 Since then, numerous 
undocumented persons convicted under § 922(g)(5) have 
challenged the constitutionality of the alien-in-possession statute. 
In fielding constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(5), courts have 
generally applied a form of intermediate scrutiny.57  
                                                                                                     
 52. See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(“While some of Heller’s language does link Second Amendment rights with the 
notions of ‘law-abiding citizens’ and ‘members of the political community,’ those 
passages did not reflect an attempt to define the term ‘people.’”); see also Note, 
The Meaning(s) of “the People” in the Constitution, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1078, 1086 
(2013) [hereinafter The Meaning(s) of “the People”] (“The question before the 
Court was whether the Second Amendment codified an individual or collective 
right, not which particular individuals possessed that right.”).  
 53. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–931 (2012). 
 54. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 902 (1997).  
 55. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (prohibiting, for example, drug addicts, felons, 
and the mentally insane from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving 
firearms). 
 56. See id. at § 922(g)(5) (providing in part that “[i]t shall be unlawful for 
any person who, being an alien . . . illegally or unlawfully in the United 
States . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or 
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 
ammunition”); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE CHIEF 
COUNSEL, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES: 
NONIMMIGRANT ALIENS AND FIREARMS DISABILITIES UNDER THE GUN CONTROL ACT 2 
(2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/10/31/nonimmi 
grant-firearms-opinion_0.pdf (discussing Congress’s decision to add a firearm 
disability for persons who are “illegally or unlawfully in the United States”).  
 57. See Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 672 (noting that courts should apply a 
heightened form of scrutiny); see also United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 
1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the alien-in-possession statute 
must survive intermediate scrutiny, assuming as a threshold matter that the 
individual has demonstrated inclusion in “the people” of the Second 
Amendment); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(8) brought by a United 
States citizen). But see United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 443 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (advocating for the case to be remanded to the 
district court to determine “in the first instance the applicable level of scrutiny 
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The Supreme Court has not directly scrutinized the meaning 
of “the people” in the context of the Second Amendment.58 In 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,59 however, the Supreme 
Court addressed the meaning of “the people” referenced in the 
Fourth Amendment.60 Verdugo-Urquidez, a citizen of Mexico, 
challenged the legality of a search of his Mexican home conducted 
by U.S. law enforcement.61 In the plurality decision, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist explicated the following understanding of “the people,” 
as used in the Constitution generally: 
“[T]he people” seems to have been a term of art employed in 
select parts of the Constitution . . . . [Its uses] suggest[] that 
‘the people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by 
the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and 
powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, 
refers to a class of persons who are part of a national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient 
connection with this country to be considered part of that 
community.62  
Accordingly, the Court rejected Verdugo-Urquidez’s claim under 
the Fourth Amendment. The Court explained that the Fourth 
Amendment did not apply to him because, at the time of the 
search, he was a resident of Mexico, had no voluntary attachment 
to the United States, and was brought to the United States 
against his will.63  
                                                                                                     
under the Second Amendment”). 
 58. See Gulasekaram, supra note 42, at 623 (“The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari, both allowing the Fifth Circuit’s strained reading to stand, and 
prolonging confusion of the scope of those who may claim the right to bear 
arms.”); see also United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1167 (2012) 
(recognizing the ambiguity in the phrase “the people”).  
 59. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).  
 60. See id. at 261 (“The question presented by this case is whether the 
Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure by United States agents of 
property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in foreign country.”).  
 61. See id. at 262 (explaining that the search occurred because federal 
agents suspected Verdugo-Urquidez of involvement in drug trafficking into the 
United States).  
 62. Id. at 265.  
 63. See id. at 274 (stating that Verdugo-Urquidez “had no voluntary 
connection with this country that might place him among ‘the people’” protected 
by the Constitution).  
GUNS AND ALIENAGE 2101 
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that an 
undocumented person’s voluntary presence in the United States, 
coupled with acceptance of “some societal obligations,” might 
qualify him or her as part of “the people.”64 Although the Court 
did not squarely address whether the Fourth Amendment applies 
to undocumented immigrants, it did adopt a test that considers 
“substantial connections” to the United States rather than legal 
status in the United States to determine the scope of “the 
people.”65 Verdugo-Urquidez stands for the proposition that “the 
people” encompasses a broader class of individuals than 
American citizens.66 Since then, courts have debated who 
qualifies for Second Amendment protection.67  
III. Confusion over Who Qualifies as “the People” for Second 
Amendment Protection 
A circuit split has developed over the meaning of “the people” 
in the Second Amendment.68 Specifically, courts disagree whether 
undocumented persons are part of “the people” to whom the right 
to bear arms belongs.69 The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits 
                                                                                                     
 64. See id. at 272 (noting that Fourth Amendment protections extended to 
the “illegal aliens in Lopez-Mendoza” because they “were in the United States 
voluntarily and presumably had accepted some societal obligations”).   
 65. See id. at 265 (1990) (noting that “the people” refers to persons 
characterized by “sufficient connections to this country” rather than 
characterized by legal status); see also Meaning(s) of “The People,” supra note 
52, at 481 (“[T]he Verdugo-Urquidez test for inclusion among ‘the people’ never 
mentions legal presence as a requirement. Instead, that test emphasizes 
‘substantial connections’ to America, ‘voluntary’ presence, and acceptance of 
‘societal obligations.’”).  
 66. See Moore, supra note 37, at 803 (discussing the “substantial 
connections” approach taken by the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez); see also 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–81 (2008) (discussing the 
relatively wide scope of those included in the term “the people,” in contrast to 
other terms such as citizens and militia).  
 67. See infra Part III (discussing the disagreement on the issue); see also 
Moore, supra note 37, at 842–45 (explaining how courts have taken different 
approaches in applying language from Verdugo-Urquidez to Second Amendment 
challenges to the alien-in-possession statute).  
 68. See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 672 n.1 (7th Cir. 
2015) (noting that the holding on the Second Amendment created a split 
between the Seventh Circuit and the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits).  
 69. See infra Part III.A–B (contrasting the legal reasoning and 
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have concluded that undocumented persons as a class do not 
qualify as “the people” for purposes of the Second Amendment.70 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit determined that 
undocumented immigrants might conceivably have Second 
Amendment rights, contingent on a showing of “substantial 
connections” to this nation.71 The Supreme Court has not directly 
spoken on who constitutes “the people” afforded Second 
Amendment rights,72 or on the constitutionality of the 
alien-in-possession statute.73  
A. Restrictive View: Undocumented Persons Are Not Part of “the 
People” Contemplated by the Second Amendment 
In United States v. Portillo-Munoz, the Fifth Circuit became 
the first federal circuit to tackle whether the Second 
Amendment’s scope extends to immigrants unlawfully present in 
the United States.74 The district court convicted Portillo-Munoz75 
of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(5).76 Portillo-Munoz appealed his conviction to the Fifth 
                                                                                                     
corresponding conclusions, which have led to the circuit split).  
 70. See infra Part III.A (discussing one side of the circuit split).  
 71. See infra Part III.B (detailing the Seventh Circuit’s holding and 
reasoning). 
 72. See Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669 (“[N]either Heller nor any other 
Supreme Court decision has addressed the issue whether unauthorized 
noncitizens (or noncitizens at all) are among ‘the people’ on whom the 
Amendment bestows this individual right.”).  
 73.  See, e.g., United States v. Meza, No. 13-CR-192, 2014 WL 1406301, at 
*4 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 11, 2014) (“T]he [Heller] Court did not discuss the 
constitutionality of the various other categories of prohibitions contained in 
§ 922, and in particular, the Court did not address the prohibition at issue 
here—that is, § 922(g)(5)’s ban on illegal aliens possessing firearms.”), aff’d on 
other grounds sub nom, United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 
2015). 
 74. See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(mentioning that no other circuits have addressed the constitutionality of a 
federal prohibition on gun ownership for undocumented immigrants). 
 75. See id. (“He admitted that he is a citizen and native of Mexico illegally 
present in the United States and that he knowingly possessed a 
firearm . . . which had been shipped or transported in interstate commerce. The 
district court sentenced him to ten months imprisonment . . . .”). 
 76. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (2012) (providing in part that “[i]t shall be 
unlawful for any person who, being an alien . . . illegally or unlawfully in the 
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Circuit, arguing in part that the federal alien-in-possession 
statute violated his Second Amendment right as a member of “the 
people.”77 He relied on United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,78 in 
which the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment’s 
use of “the people” to conceivably include noncitizens having a 
certain threshold of connections to the United States.79 Drawing 
an analogy between the use of “the people” in the Second and 
Fourth Amendments, Portillo-Munoz posited that the Second 
Amendment affords illegal immigrants the right to bear arms.80  
Relying heavily on District of Columbia v. Heller, a divided 
panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court and 
concluded that Portillo-Munoz’s conviction under § 922(g)(5) did 
not violate the Second Amendment.81 More specifically, the court 
addressed the scope of the Second Amendment, concluding that 
“[w]hatever else the term means or includes, the phrase ‘the 
people’ . . . does not include aliens illegally in the United States 
such as Portillo.”82  
The Fifth Circuit panel justified its decision on several 
grounds. First, the court interpreted Heller as restricting Second 
Amendment protection to “law-abiding, responsible citizens” or 
“members of the political community.”83 The Fifth Circuit 
                                                                                                     
United States . . . to possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition”).  
 77. See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 439 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating that 
Portillo-Munoz posited that a federal prohibition of firearm possession by illegal 
immigrants violated the Second Amendment).  
 78. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).  
 79. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) 
(“‘[T]he people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and 
Second Amendments . . . refers to a class or persons who are part of a national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connections with this 
country to be considered part of that community.”). 
 80. See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(“Portillo relies on Verdugo-Urquidez and argues that he has sufficient 
connections with the United States to be included in this definition of ‘the 
people’ . . . .”).  
 81. See id. at 442 (“[W]e hold that section 922(g)(5) is constitutional under 
the Second Amendment.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440 (arguing that the Heller Court’s 
reference to “‘the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in 
defense of hearth and home’” may reveal an intent to define “the meaning of the 
term ‘the people’ as it is used in the Second Amendment” (quoting District of 
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reasoned that unauthorized immigrants by default do not satisfy 
the “law-abiding, responsible citizen” requirement.84 Second, the 
court rejected Portillo-Munoz’s “attempt[] to precisely analogize 
the scope” of the Second and Fourth Amendments.85 Instead, the 
court argued that the purposes of the Second and Fourth 
Amendments differed; the Second Amendment is an affirmative 
right and has a narrower scope than the Fourth Amendment, 
which is a protective right.86 The court concluded that the 
differing purposes of the Second and Fourth Amendments permit 
a distinct interpretation of “the people” in each amendment.87 By 
creating this novel dichotomy between affirmative and protective 
rights,88 the Fifth Circuit panel managed to exclude categorically 
illegal immigrants from the Second Amendment’s scope.89 
Finally, the Fifth Circuit justified its conclusion in light of 
Congress’s judicially affirmed power to make laws “that 
distinguish between lawful and illegal aliens.”90  
Judge James Dennis dissented in Portillo-Munoz.91 He 
applied the “substantial connections” test from Verdugo-Urquidez 
                                                                                                     
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008))).  
 84. See id. at 440 (“[A]liens who enter or remain in this country illegally 
and without authorization are not Americans as that word is commonly 
understood.”).  
 85. Id. at 441.  
 86. See id. at 440–41 (“The purposes of the Second and the Fourth 
Amendment are different. The Second Amendment grants an affirmative right 
to keep and bear arms, while the Fourth Amendment is at its core a protective 
right against abuses by the government.”). 
 87.  See id. at 441 (finding it “reasonable that an affirmative right” such as 
the Second Amendment “would be extended to fewer groups than would a 
protective right” like the Fourth Amendment).  
 88. See McGee-Tubb, supra note 41, at 87 (“The Fifth Circuit’s 
categorization of constitutional amendments by the types of rights they grant 
and use of this categorization to determine the beneficiaries of those rights 
signals a departure from traditional approaches to defining ‘the people’ in the 
constitutional amendments.”).  
 89. See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(justifying its conclusion on the grounds that the use of “the people” in the 
Second and Fourth Amendments does not “mandate[] a holding that the two 
amendments cover exactly the same group of people”).  
 90. Id. at 442.  
 91. See id. at 442–48 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (concurring in the majority’s 
dismissal of Portillo-Munoz’s Fifth Amendment claim but dissenting from the 
majority’s dismissal of his Second Amendment claim).  
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to determine that Portillo-Munoz had the requisite connections 
to the United States to be considered part of the Second 
Amendment’s “the people.”92 Judge Dennis rejected the 
“affirmative versus protective rights” dichotomy erected by the 
majority and argued that “the people” in the Second and Fourth 
Amendments necessarily refers to the same group of persons.93 
Furthermore, he emphasized that who qualifies as “the people” 
turns on an individual’s connections to the United States rather 
than legal status in the United States.94  
Portillo-Munoz set the tone for discussing inclusion and 
exclusion with respect to “the people” of the Second 
Amendment.95 Before long, other federal circuits followed the 
Fifth Circuit’s lead by categorically excluding undocumented 
persons from the Second Amendment.96 Several months after 
the Portillo-Munoz decision, the Eighth Circuit aligned with the 
Fifth Circuit’s exclusion of undocumented immigrants through 
its brief per curiam decision in United States v. Flores.97  
For reasons similar to those enunciated in Portillo-
Munoz, the Fourth Circuit also upheld § 922(g)(5) against a 
Second Amendment challenge.98 In United States v. Carpio-
                                                                                                     
 92. See id. at 443 (explaining that Portillo-Munoz voluntarily entered the 
United States, resided here, and accepted a variety of societal obligations).  
 93. See id. at 444–45 (noting that such a characterization is incongruous 
with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Heller and Doe).  
 94. See id. at 446 (“Nothing in Verdugo-Urquidez requires that the alien 
must be lawfully present in the United States in order to establish substantial 
connections.”).  
 95. See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(noting that the Fifth Circuit is the first federal circuit to address whether the 
Second Amendment extends to undocumented persons).  
 96. For example, the Eighth Circuit, which was the next circuit to address 
this question, relied wholly on the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in reaching its 
conclusion. Infra note 97.  
 97. See 663 F.3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 28 (2012) (“Agreeing with the Fifth Circuit that the protections of the 
Second Amendment do not extend to aliens illegally present in this country, we 
affirm.”).  
 98. See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 976 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(“[T]he scope of the Second Amendment does not extend to provide protection to 
illegal aliens, because illegal aliens are not law-abiding members of the political 
community and . . . have no more rights under the Second Amendment than do 
aliens outside of the United States seeking admittance.”), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 
58 (2013). 
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Leon,99 the defendant argued that “the Second Amendment could 
not have been intended to exclude illegal aliens from its scope” 
because the Founders held immigrants in high-esteem.100 To 
conduct a historical analysis like that employed in Heller,101 the 
court surveyed English and colonial history to determine what 
groups of persons were permitted to possess firearms.102 In so 
doing, the Fourth Circuit concluded, “[I]llegal aliens do not belong 
to the class of law-abiding members of the political community to 
whom the Second Amendment gives protection.”103 Reminiscent of 
the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Portillo-Munoz, the court 
emphasized that undocumented persons inherently do not qualify 
as “members of the political community” for the purpose of the 
Second Amendment because of their “crime of illegal entry.”104  
Confronted with the constitutionality of the federal 
alien-in-possession statute in United States v. Huitron-Guizar,105 
the Tenth Circuit flirted with the substantive Second 
Amendment arguments before ultimately passing on the legal 
question.106 Although the court noted the frequency with which 
the Heller Court “connected arms-bearing and citizenship,” it 
hesitated to assume the converse by inferring that “the right to 
bear arms is categorically inapplicable to non-citizens.”107 
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit hinted that it would be willing to 
                                                                                                     
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 976.  
 101. See id. at 979 (“Even though the Heller Court . . . did not face a law 
prohibiting firearms possession by a particular class of persons . . . we can 
employ the historical analysis it prescribed to apply its observations to this 
case . . . .”).  
 102. See id. at 980 (discussing, for example, how colonial governments 
prohibited suspect groups from possessing firearms). 
 103. Id. at 981.  
 104. See id. (specifying that the holding is limited “as to illegal aliens by 
their particular relationship to the United States,” which is characterized by 
“the crime of illegal entry”).  
 105. 678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 106. See id. at 1169 (“We think we can avoid the constitutional question by 
assuming, for purposes of this case, that the Second Amendment, as a ‘right of 
the people,’ could very well include, in the absence of a statute restricting such a 
right, at least some aliens unlawfully here—and still easily find § 922(g)(5) 
constitutional.”).  
 107. Id. at 1168. 
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defer to Congress on the Second Amendment issue.108 Ultimately, 
the Tenth Circuit upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) under 
intermediate scrutiny,109 having assumed, arguendo, that “the 
people” could conceivably include undocumented immigrants.110  
In uniformly upholding § 922(g)(5) against constitutional 
challenges,111 the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits all held that 
undocumented immigrants are not part of “the people” protected 
by the Second Amendment,112 and the Tenth Circuit avoided the 
issue altogether.113 Accordingly, a plethora of federal district 
courts have also concluded that noncitizens illegally present in 
the United States are not part of “the people” and therefore are 
not afforded Second Amendment rights.114 
                                                                                                     
 108. See id. at 1169 (“That Congress saw fit to exclude illegal aliens from 
carrying guns may indicate its belief, entitled to our respect, that such aliens, as 
a class, possess no such constitutional right.”).  
 109. See id. at 1170 (concluding that § 922(g)(5) survives intermediate 
scrutiny in light of Congress’s lawful interest in promoting public safety and 
security).  
 110. See id. at 1169 (explaining how the court dodged the Second 
Amendment issue).  
 111. See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 975 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(“Concluding that § 922(g)(5) is constitutional, we affirm.”), cert denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 58 (2013); United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 
2012) (“On this record, § 922(g)(5) withstands Mr. Huitron-Guizar’s Second 
Amendment and Equal Protection challenges.”); United States v. 
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that section 
922(g)(5) is constitutional under the Second Amendment.”); United States v. 
Flores, 663 F.3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Flores moved to dismiss the 
indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(5)(A) was facially unconstitutional . . . . The 
district court denied the motion . . . we affirm.”). 
 112. See Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d at 976 (concluding that the Second 
Amendment does not extend to “illegal aliens”); Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442 
(concluding that “the people” does not include “aliens illegally” in the United 
States); Flores, 663 F.3d at 1023 (concluding in its per curiam decision that the 
Second Amendment does not afford “aliens illegally present in this country” gun 
ownership rights). 
 113. See Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d at 977 (“[T]he Tenth Circuit avoided the 
question of whether illegal aliens are protected by the Second Amendment and 
upheld § 922(g)(5) because it passed intermediate scrutiny.”); supra notes 105–
110 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s approach and 
reasoning). 
 114. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Guillen, No. 2:10cr192-MEF, 2011 
WL 588350, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 12, 2011) (“Defendant’s motion fails to counter 
in any meaningful way the weight and reasoning of the case law discussed 
above, which has uniformly concluded that § 922(g)(5)(A) is a ‘presumptively 
lawful’ prohibition on the possession of firearms.”); United States v. 
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B. Expansive View: Undocumented Persons Are Contingently 
Included in “The People” Contemplated by the Second Amendment 
The Seventh Circuit’s ruling in United States v. 
Meza-Rodriguez115 created the circuit split over the meaning of 
“the people” in the Second Amendment.116 The Seventh Circuit 
separated itself from the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, 
finding that there is no way to differentiate the “the people” of the 
Second Amendment from “the people” referenced in other 
amendments.117 Although the Seventh Circuit panel ultimately 
upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(5), it uniquely determined 
that undocumented immigrants who have substantial 
connections to the United States qualify as “the people” for 
Second Amendment purposes.118  
                                                                                                     
Adame-Najera, No. 2:10-CR-10-01-RWS-SSC, 2010 WL 6529643, at *3 (N.D. Ga. 
Nov. 24, 2010) (“[T]he Second Amendment does not bar the Government’s 
prosecution of Defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).”); United States v. Flores, 
Crim. No. 10-178, 2010 WL 4720223, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 15, 2010) (“Nothing 
argued by Defendant, or in Heller itself, persuades this Court that § 922(g)(5)(A) 
is different from the other status-based exceptions listed under § 922(g).”), aff’d, 
663 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Luviano-Vega, No. 
5:10-CR-184-BO, 2010 WL 3732137, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2010) (“[A]n alien 
cannot claim a right to bear arms under the Constitution. Section 922(g)(5), 
which criminalizes the possession of firearms by illegal aliens, is therefore a 
valid exercise of Congressional power.”); United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 
09-40056-01-SAC, 2010 WL 411112, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010) (“The court 
thus finds that the challenged statute survives Second Amendment scrutiny.”); 
United States v. Boffil-Rivera, No. 08-20437-CR, 2008 WL 8853354, at *8 (S.D. 
Fla. Aug. 12, 2008) (“Clearly, under any historical interpretation of the 
enactment of the Second Amendment or the interpretation of any similar right 
under the Constitution, the individual right to bear arms defined by Heller does 
not apply to an illegal and unlawful alien.”), aff’d, 607 F.3d 736 (11th Cir. 2010).  
 115. 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015).  
 116. See id. at 672 n.1 (noting that the holding on the Second Amendment 
created a split between the Seventh Circuit and the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth 
Circuits).  
 117. See id. at 672 (determining that there is “no principled way to carve out 
the Second Amendment and say that the unauthorized (or maybe all 
noncitizens) are excluded”).  
 118. See id. at 673 (“Congress’s interest in prohibiting persons who are 
difficult to track and who have an interest in eluding law enforcement is strong 
enough to support the conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) does not 
impermissibly restrict Meza-Rodriguez’s Second Amendment right to bear arms.” 
(emphasis added)). Importantly, the Seventh Circuit did not hold that 
undocumented immigrants categorically, as a group, qualify as part of “the 
people” for Second Amendment purposes. Id. at 670. Rather, the legitimacy of 
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In August 2013, Mariano Meza-Rodriguez was arrested for 
unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of the federal 
alien-in-possession statute.119 Defendant Meza-Rodriguez moved 
to dismiss the indictment, alleging that § 922(g)(5) 
unconstitutionally infringed on his Second Amendment right.120 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
denied Meza-Rodriguez’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that 
immigrants unlawfully present in the United States do not 
receive Second Amendment protection.121  
Chief Judge Diane P. Wood, writing for the majority, 
affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, but 
on different grounds—holding that undocumented immigrants as 
a group are neither categorically included nor excluded from 
Second Amendment protection.122 First, the Seventh Circuit’s 
panel found the Heller Court’s “passing references” purportedly 
linking gun ownership to citizenship unpersuasive.123  
                                                                                                     
an undocumented immigrant-defendant’s claim to Second Amendment 
protection is a case-by-case analysis, contingent on a showing of “substantial 
connections” with the United States. Id. If the unlawful immigrant shows 
“substantial connections,” then the Second Amendment rights attach. Id.  
 119. Id. Meza-Rodriguez’s family brought him to the United States when he 
was four or five years old. Id. From then on, he remained in the United States 
and did not regularize his status. Id.  
 120. Id. Meza-Rodriguez filed three motions: (1) to dismiss the indictment 
for failure to allege an element of the offense; (2) to dismiss the indictment on 
constitutional grounds; and (3) to suppress statements. Id. The only motion of 
relevance to this Note is the constitutional argument.  
 121. See United States v. Meza, No. 13-CR-192, 2014 WL 1406301, at *4 
(E.D. Wis. Apr. 11, 2014) (noting that Meza-Rodriguez’s facial challenge to the 
alien-in-possession statute must fail because Second Amendment protection 
does “not extend to aliens illegally present in the United States”), aff’d on other 
grounds sub nom, United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 
2015). As a part of his constitutional claim, Meza-Rodriguez also asserted an 
as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(5). Id. at *14–18. The court applied 
intermediate scrutiny and rejected his claim in light of his “criminal history and 
evasive conduct.” Id. at *18.  
 122. See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(noting that the court would not endorse the district court’s rationale, which 
swept too far in categorically denying undocumented immigrants access to 
Second Amendment protections). Nevertheless, the court affirmed on the 
grounds that “the Second Amendment does not preclude certain restrictions on 
the right to bear arms, including the one imposed by § 922(g)(5).” Id.  
 123. See id. at 669 (recognizing that “those passages did not reflect an 
attempt to define the term ‘the people,’” and therefore are mere dicta). The 
Meza-Rodriguez majority also cited additional language from Heller, which 
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Next, the Meza-Rodriguez majority argued that one may 
properly draw an analogy between the use of “the people” in the 
Second Amendment and in the other parts of the Bill of Rights.124 
The court decided to interpret identical terms in an identical 
manner.125 Accordingly, it applied the Verdugo-Urquidez Fourth 
Amendment standard for determining whether unauthorized 
non-citizens are entitled to invoke constitutional protections as 
members of “the people.”126 Despite Meza-Rodriguez’s “unsavory 
traits,” which included several run-ins with the law, the panel 
concluded that he had developed the requisite “substantial 
connections”127 as a resident in this country to garner Second 
Amendment protection.128 Meza-Rodriguez developed “extensive 
ties” with the U.S. through twenty years of residency, public 
school attendance, and periodic employment.129 Ultimately, the 
                                                                                                     
supports the notion that “all people including non-U.S. citizens, whether or not 
they are authorized to be in the country, enjoy at least some rights under the 
Second Amendment.” Id.  
 124. See id. at 670 (concluding that “the people” in the Second Amendment 
has the same meaning as “the people” in other parts of the Bill of Rights); supra 
notes 85–89 and accompanying text (explaining that the Fifth Circuit rejected 
this argument). 
 125. See id. (“An interpretation of the Second Amendment as consistent with 
the other amendments passed as part of the Bill of Rights has the advantage of 
treating identical phrasing in the same way and respecting the fact that the 
first ten amendments were adopted as a package.”).  
 126. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) 
(“‘[T]he people’ protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and 
Second Amendments . . . refers to a class of persons who are part of a national 
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connections with this 
country to be considered part of that community.” (citing United States ex rel. 
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904))).  
 127. See Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 671 (discussing Meza-Rodriguez’s 
continuous and voluntary presence in the United States for over twenty years, 
his public school attendance, contributions through work, and family 
relationships in the nation).  
 128. See id. at 672 (“During [Meza-Rodriguez’s time in the United States], 
his behavior left much to be desired, but as we have said, that does not mean 
that he lacks substantial connections with this country.”). The court also 
rejected the government’s argument that unauthorized non-citizens’ status by 
default excludes them from the people referred to in the Second Amendment. Id. 
Referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler v. Doe, 467 U.S. 202 (1982), 
the Seventh Circuit noted that “unauthorized status (reflected in the lack of 
documentation) cannot support a per se exclusion from ‘the people’ protected by 
the Bill of Rights.” Id.  
 129. See id. at 670–71 (listing the manifestations of Meza-Rodriguez’s 
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Seventh Circuit found that § 922(g)(5) satisfies intermediate 
scrutiny.130 Nonetheless, the Meza-Rodriguez decision represents 
the first and only time that a federal circuit has concluded that 
an undocumented non-citizen is entitled to invoke Second 
Amendment protection.131  
IV. Critique of the Restrictive View 
This Note posits that the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits 
erroneously concluded that undocumented immigrants are not 
part of “the people.” Those circuits erred in three prominent 
ways. First, they conflated the two distinct issues raised by 
constitutional challenges to the alien-in-possession statute.132 
Courts holding to the Restrictive View have often invoked 
Congress’s power to restrict access to guns to justify their 
conclusion.133 Although public policy arguments are pertinent 
when § 922(g)(5) is subject to intermediate scrutiny, they have no 
relevance to the threshold issue of who qualifies as part of “the 
people” for Second Amendment purposes.134 Second, the 
Restrictive-View courts’ reliance on Heller’s references to 
“citizenship” is misguided because those references, at best, 
amount to dicta.135 Finally, the Fifth Circuit’s attempt to construe 
“the people” of the Second Amendment as narrower than “the 
people” of the Fourth Amendment contradicts precedent and 
amounts to a thinly-veiled, artificial attempt to bar 
                                                                                                     
connections to the U.S.).  
 130. See id. at 673 (“18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) satisfies intermediate scrutiny and 
thus passes constitutional muster.”).  
 131. See United States v. Cordoba, No. 3:15-CR-067, 2015 WL 6680890, at 
*2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 30, 2015) (noting that the court in Meza-Rodriguez took “the 
lead” in holding that the Second Amendment applies to an undocumented 
immigrant who has sufficient connections to this nation).  
 132. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the unwarranted reliance on 
congressional power and public policy to determine the scope of “the people” of 
the Second Amendment).  
 133. Infra Part IV.A.  
 134. Infra Part IV.A.  
 135. See infra Part IV.B (explaining why Heller should not be construed to 
support a restrictive reading of the scope of “the people” contemplated by the 
Second Amendment).  
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undocumented persons from the panoply of rights reserved to 
“the people.”136  
A. The Critical Error of Conflation 
Constitutional challenges to the alien-in-possession statute 
implicate two distinct issues: (1) whether “the people” referred to 
in the Second Amendment includes undocumented persons and, if 
so, (2) whether § 922(g)(5) constitutes a permissible infringement 
on undocumented persons’ Second Amendment rights.137 The 
circuits holding to the Restrictive View relied heavily on 
reasoning and precedent that are inapposite to the threshold 
issue of whether undocumented immigrants are part of “the 
people.”138  
As the first federal circuit to consider the issue, the Fifth 
Circuit panel erred in its reasoning.139 It is evident that the 
majority in Portillo-Munoz conflated the two issues because it in 
part justified its conclusion that Portillo-Munoz was not part of 
“the people” in light of Congress’s power to make “laws that 
distinguish between citizens and aliens and between lawful and 
illegal aliens.”140 The majority explicitly stated that it considered 
Congress’s aforementioned power to be “persuasive in 
interpreting the text of the Second Amendment.”141 Although 
                                                                                                     
 136. See infra Part IV.C (explaining how the Fifth Circuit’s rights-based 
approach conflicts with the interpretative paradigm outlined in 
Verdugo-Urquidez and affirmed by reference in Heller).  
 137. See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 977 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(noting that this two-part approach to Second Amendment claims is appropriate 
(citing United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010))). 
 138. See infra notes 139–162 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have conflated the main issues). 
 139. Importantly, the Eighth Circuit’s per curiam opinion in United States v. 
Flores essentially incorporated by reference the reasoning from the majority 
opinion in Portillo-Munoz. See United States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022, 1023 (8th 
Cir. 2011). Therefore, this Note’s critique of the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning also 
applies to the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning.  
 140. See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has long held that Congress has the authority to make 
laws governing the conduct of aliens that would be unconstitutional if made to 
apply to citizens.” (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 (1976))). 
 141. Id. at 442.  
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congressional power is highly relevant—maybe even dispositive—
to the second issue of whether the alien-in-possession statute 
violates the Second Amendment, it is inapposite to whether “the 
people” includes undocumented persons like Portillo-Munoz.142 
Even if Congress may discriminate between aliens and citizens, 
this authority does not come to bear on the scope of “the 
people.”143 Defining the “who” of the Second Amendment is an 
interpretative question, not a policy matter.144 In essence, the 
majority relied on an argument that should have been irrelevant 
to the inquiry. 
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit suggested in Huitron-Guizar 
that the fact that Congress prohibited undocumented persons 
from possessing guns might be dispositive that, as a class, 
undocumented persons categorically do not have any rights under 
the Second Amendment.145 The court even suggested that such an 
inference is “entitled to our respect.”146 The Tenth Circuit also 
assumed that the existence of the alien-in-possession statute is 
prima facie evidence that undocumented persons are properly 
excluded from “the people.”147 Oddly enough, the court 
subsequently assumed, arguendo for the purposes of the case at 
hand, that the Second Amendment could include undocumented 
persons.148 Nevertheless, the damage was already done in that 
the Tenth Circuit perpetuated the problem of conflation that has 
                                                                                                     
 142. See id. at 448 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (explaining how the majority 
opinion reached the wrong conclusion by appealing to Congress’s power to make 
laws that distinguish based on alienage). 
 143. Id.  
 144. See id. (emphasizing the irrelevance of applying intermediate scrutiny 
to determine the threshold question about the scope of the right).  
 145. See United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 
2012) (“That Congress saw fit to exclude illegal aliens from carrying guns may 
indicate its belief, entitled to our respect, that such aliens, as a class, possess no 
such constitutional right.”).  
 146. Id.  
 147. See id. (arguing that it can avoid deciding the scope of “the people” by 
assuming “for the purpose of this case, that the Second Amendment, as a ‘right 
of the people,’ could very well include, in the absence of a statute restricting such 
a right, at least some aliens unlawfully here” (emphasis added)).  
 148. See id. (“The apparent inconsistency in assuming the existence of a 
right before sustaining a law that acts as a blanket prohibition on it is, we 
believe, outweighed by the prudence of abstaining on a question of such 
far-reaching dimensions . . . .”).  
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plagued this discussion, even while making a concerted effort to 
keep the two issues distinct.149  
The Fourth Circuit made a similar error when it confronted a 
challenge to the alien-in-possession statute.150 In United States v. 
Carpio-Leon,151 the panel stated that it would probe only the first 
issue—whether the Second Amendment right extends to the 
undocumented—and would not reach the second step of the 
analysis.152 Yet, in its attempt to define the scope of “the people,” 
the court discussed the theory that historically “the government 
could disarm unvirtuous citizens.”153 Contrary to the Fourth 
Circuit’s analysis, the government’s authority to disarm persons 
who are not law-abiding is not dispositive of whether 
undocumented immigrants qualify as “the people.”154 That is an 
important inquiry in the second step of the analysis—a step that 
the Fourth Circuit claimed it would not reach in Carpio-Leon.155  
Perhaps the most blatant example of the senseless conflation 
of the issues comes out of the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California in United States v. Torres.156 During the 
motion to dismiss proceedings, Judge Edward J. Davila stated 
that the Second Amendment does not apply to undocumented 
individuals “because of 922.”157 Indicative of the strained 
                                                                                                     
 149. See id. (recognizing that the issue of alienage and the Second 
Amendment implicates two distinct issues while also emphasizing the 
importance of deferring to Congress).  
 150. See infra notes 152–155 (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s inability to 
avoid conflating the analysis under the two issues).  
 151. 701 F.3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 152. See id. at 982 (“[W]e hold that the Second Amendment right to bear 
arms does not extend to illegal aliens, and therefore, without the need of 
proceeding to the second step of Chester, we conclude that [the constitutional 
challenge] must fail.”).  
 153. Id. at 980. 
 154. See id. at 980–81 (justifying its conclusion that “illegal aliens do not fall 
in the class of persons” for Second Amendment protection based on historical 
evidence that “the government could disarm individuals who are not 
law-abiding members of the political community”).  
 155. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (referencing the two-step 
inquiry and explaining that the court would address only the first issue).  
 156. See generally United States v. Torres, CV-14-00255-EJD (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
22, 2015).  
 157. See Transcript of Record at 15, United States v. Torres, 
CV-14-00255-EJD, 15 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2015) (“There’s a rational basis for the 
Second Amendment and troubling as it is, perhaps define that there is at least 
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reasoning used to justify alienage exclusions from the Second 
Amendment, Judge Davila employed circular reasoning to 
explain his conclusion. At the heart of these verbal gymnastics 
lies a futile attempt to justify something that is inherently 
unjustifiable.  
In sum, the courts embracing the Restrictive View have often 
engaged in a classic game of begging the question.158 First, they 
purport to address the scope of “the people” contemplated by the 
Second Amendment.159 Second, they pontificate about Congress’s 
authority to exclude undocumented persons due to the legitimate 
policy concerns of safety and security, which ultimately led to 
passage of the alien-in-possession statute.160 Next, the courts 
have assumed the conclusion—that the undocumented are not 
part of “the people”—by the very existence of the 
alien-in-possession statute.161 Finally, the courts complete the 
analysis by justifying the constitutionality of the 
alien-in-possession statute by reminding the reader how it just 
concluded that the undocumented are not part of “the people.”162 
The conclusion and the premise are indistinguishable because 
each is invariably invoked to validate the other.  
                                                                                                     
one amendment that doesn’t apply because of 922, doesn’t apply to 
undocumented individuals when all of the other important amendments do and 
there is somewhat of a—it’s not fair.”). 
 158. See infra notes 158–162 and accompanying text (explaining the fallacy 
in which these courts have engaged).  
 159. See, e.g., United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 
2011) (framing the issue as whether the Second Amendment protection extends 
to undocumented persons present in the United States).  
 160. See id. at 441 (“[T]he Supreme Court has long held that Congress has 
the authority to make laws governing the conduct of aliens that would be 
unconstitutional if made to apply to citizens.”); United States v. Carpio-Leon, 
701 F.3d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 2012) (relying on the idea that Congress historically 
had the authority to disarm persons who are not law-abiding).  
 161. See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 442 (relying on Congress’s authority to 
make laws, which distinguish based on alienage, to interpret the text of the 
Second Amendment).  
 162. See, e.g., id. at 442 (“Whatever else the term means or includes, the 
phrase ‘the people’ in the Second Amendment of the Constitution does not 
include aliens illegally in the United States such as Portillo, and we hold that 
section 922(g)(5) is constitutional under the Second Amendment.”).  
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C. The Unwarranted Reliance on Heller Dicta 
Some courts have relied on the following passage from 
District of Columbia v. Heller to support the idea that “the 
people” of the Second Amendment refers exclusively to a specific 
subset of citizens:  
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose 
core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-
balancing’ approach . . . . The First Amendment contains the 
freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which 
included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state 
secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and 
wrong-headed views. The Second Amendment is no different. 
Like the First, it is the very product of an interest balancing 
by the people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for 
them anew. And whatever else it leaves to future evaluation, it 
surely elevates above all other interests the right of 
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of 
hearth and home.163  
Relying on this language from Heller, the majority in 
Portillo-Munoz determined that the Second Amendment applied 
only to those “law-abiding, responsible citizens” who qualify as 
part of the “political community.”164 In the wake of 
Portillo-Munoz, other courts have also emphasized the Supreme 
Court’s reference to “law-abiding citizens” to reject constitutional 
challenges to the alien-in-possession statute.165 One commentator 
has even asserted that the Heller Court did implicitly define “the 
people” of the Second Amendment as excluding all non-citizens.166 
                                                                                                     
 163. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008).  
 164. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 580, 635).  
 165. See, e.g., United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 976 (4th Cir. 
2012) (recounting how the district court denied Carpio-Leon’s motion because 
“Heller foreclose[s] [his] argument that aliens illegally present in the United 
States are among those protected by the Second Amendment.”); United States v. 
Guerrero-Leco, No. 3:08CR118 , 2008 WL 4534226, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 6, 2008) 
(relying on Heller to conclude that the right belongs to only citizens), 
vacated, 446 F. App’x 610 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Boffil-Rivera, No. 
08-20437-CR, 2008 WL 8853354, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2008) (“Clearly, under 
any historical interpretation of the enactment of the Second Amendment or the 
interpretation of any similar right under the Constitution, the individual right 
to bear arms defined by Heller does not apply to an illegal and unlawful alien.”), 
aff’d, 607 F.3d 736 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 166. See Salnikova, supra note 39, at 626 (“The Court defined ‘the people’ as 
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Furthermore, it has been argued that “Heller explicitly extended 
its reading of ‘the people’ to the other amendments, thereby 
excluding illegal aliens from membership in ‘the people’ across 
the Bill of Rights.”167 
Reliance on Heller to resolve the precise scope of “the people” 
in the Second Amendment is unwarranted for several reasons. 
First, the issue of whether undocumented persons are part of “the 
people” was not before the Court in Heller.168 In fact, Heller 
intended only to resolve whether the Second Amendment 
conferred an individual or collective right.169 Importantly, the 
Court did not mention any form of the words “immigrant” or 
“alien” in the opinion.170 Boiled down, Heller focused on the 
“what” of the Second Amendment, while the important issue here 
is the “who” of the Second Amendment.171 Amidst its reliance on 
Heller, the Fifth Circuit even admits that Heller did not intend to 
reach the question of the scope of “the people.”172 
                                                                                                     
‘all members of the political community’ who are ‘law-abiding, responsible 
citizens.’ The terms ‘political,’ ‘law-abiding,’ and ‘citizen’ seem to exclude 
deliberately those who broke the law or those who are non-American 
citizens . . . .” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635)).  
 167. Id. at 627.  
 168. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 570 (framing the issue as “[w]hether the 
following provisions—D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 7-2507.02—
violate the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not affiliated with 
any state-regulated militia, but who wish to keep handguns and other firearms 
for private use in their homes?”); see also United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 
F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2015) (“This issue was not, however, before the Court in 
Heller.”); Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d at 979 (“Even though the Heller Court stressed 
that the core right of the Second Amendment protects law-abiding members of 
the political community, it did not face a law prohibiting firearms possession by 
a particular class of persons.”); Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 445 (Dennis, J., 
dissenting) (“Heller did not address the question of whether noncitizens, 
lawfully or unlawfully present in the United States, have Second Amendment 
rights.”).  
 169. See United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1168–69 (10th Cir. 
2012) (“[T]he question in Heller was the amendment’s raison d’être—does it 
protect an individual or collective right?—and aliens were not part of the 
calculus.”). 
 170. See id. at 1168 (“Neither the majority nor dissents mentioned ‘aliens,’ 
‘immigrants,’ or ‘non-citizens.’”).  
 171. See id. at 1166 (explaining that attempts to define the scope of “the 
people” concerns the “who” rather than the “what” of the Second Amendment).  
 172. See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he question of whether an alien, illegal or legal, has the right to bear arms 
was not presented [in Heller] . . . .”).  
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Furthermore, there is no indication that the Court’s passing 
references to “law-abiding citizens” were intentionally calculated 
to inform the meaning of “the people.”173 Several alternative 
explanations deserve consideration. First, the references to 
“law-abiding citizens” may have been merely inadvertent.174 
Another possibility is that the Court used that language to 
indicate who definitely was a part of “the people,” rather than 
using that language to define the limits of “the people.” Nothing 
indicates that the Court in Heller used the “law-abiding, 
responsible citizen” phrase to the exclusion of “irresponsible 
citizens” or “responsible noncitizens.”175 Regardless, this 
discussion, at the very least, indicates that what the Heller Court 
did and why they did it is far from clear. 176  
The majority opinion in Heller recognized that their decision 
hardly represents an exhaustive interpretation of the entire 
Second Amendment.177 As one commentator has noted, Heller 
admitted that its survey of the Second Amendment is “capacious 
enough to permit future growth.”178 The Meza-Rodriguez court 
took the proper approach, noting that it was “reluctant to place 
more weight on these passing references than the Court itself 
did.”179 
Notably, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits also did not find the 
Heller dicta persuasive. The Tenth Circuit noted how “frequently 
[Heller] connected arms-bearing and citizenship” but refused to 
“infer from Heller a rule that the right to bear arms is 
                                                                                                     
 173. See Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287, 298 (D. Mass. 2012) (noting 
that reading Heller as restricting the Second Amendment to law-abiding citizens 
“requires a considerable analytical strain”).  
 174. See Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d at 1168 (“Nor can we say that the word 
‘citizen’ was used deliberately to settle the question, not least because doing so 
would conflict with Verdugo-Urquidez, a case Heller relied on.”). 
 175. See Meaning(s) of “the People,” supra note 52, at 1086 (“Because Heller 
did not hold that only law-abiding, responsible citizens have Second Amendment 
rights, it is possible that irresponsible citizens—or responsible noncitizens—
could have such rights, too.”). 
 176. See id. at 1079 (“[D]ue to its many ambiguities, Heller has not resolved 
the meaning of ‘the people’ in the Second Amendment.”).  
 177. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) 
(acknowledging that it does not “clarify the entire field” by leaving some Second 
Amendment questions open to future inquiry).  
 178. Id.  
 179. United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2015).  
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categorically inapplicable to non-citizens.”180 Heller does not 
provide clear guidance in interpreting the scope of “the people,” 
and, therefore, courts should avoid relying on the passing 
references to “law-abiding citizens” in Heller.181 At best, the 
Court’s references to law-abiding citizens are dicta.182  
C. The Misguided Reliance on an “Affirmative Versus Protective 
Rights” Dichotomy 
In Portillo-Munoz, the Fifth Circuit went to great lengths to 
distinguish the seemingly identical uses of “the people” in the 
Second and Fourth Amendments.183 Specifically, the majority 
opinion endeavored to distinguish the two amendments by 
inventing an alleged divergence in their purposes.184 The opinion 
argued that the Second Amendment grants an affirmative right, 
while the Fourth Amendment grants protective rights.185 
According to the court, the scope of protective rights is more 
expansive than the scope of affirmative rights.186 A protective 
right—and, presumably, a relatively narrow right—such as the 
right to bear arms as codified in the Second Amendment does not 
                                                                                                     
 180. United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2012).  
 181. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287, 298 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(refusing to rely on the references to citizenship in Heller as a limiting of the 
scope of “the people” because it is unsupported by the historical meaning of “the 
people,” contradicts the Constitution’s structure, and conflicts with 
Verdugo-Urquidez, which Heller cited with approval).  
 182. See id. (concluding that the “citizenship” terminology in Heller 
represented mere dicta).  
 183. See infra notes 184–187 and accompanying text (explaining the Fifth 
Circuit’s reasoning).  
 184. See McGee-Tubb, supra note 41, at 87 (“The Fifth Circuit’s 
categorization of constitutional amendments by the types of rights they grant 
and use of this categorization to determine the beneficiaries of those rights 
signals a departure from traditional approaches to defining ‘the people’ in the 
constitutional amendments.”). 
 185. See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(arguing that the Second and Fourth Amendments have divergent purposes 
because the Second Amendment grants an affirmative right to bear arms and 
the Fourth Amendment protects against government abuses).  
 186. See id. (“[W]e find it reasonable that an affirmative right would be 
extended to fewer groups than would a protective right.”).  
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extend to the class of undocumented persons.187 The Fifth 
Circuit’s affirmative versus protective rights dichotomy, so to 
speak, diverges substantially from the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Verdugo-Urquidez and Heller.188 In Heller, the Supreme Court 
approvingly quoted from Verdugo-Urquidez that the Second and 
Fourth Amendments protect the same set of “people.”189 In 
contrast, the Fifth Circuit’s rights-based approach represents a 
departure from Heller by “limit[ing] the constitutional rights’ 
applicability according to the types of rights they grant rather 
than by the definition of ‘the people’ shared by the constitutional 
amendments employing the term.”190 Heller, which stands as the 
seminal Second Amendment case, made no mention of the Second 
Amendment as an “affirmative right.”191 Rather, Heller opined 
that the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments functioned 
similarly in that they codified “pre-existing right[s].”192 Therefore, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the Supreme Court did not find it 
necessary to split hairs and further delineate between the 
purposes of the Second and Fourth Amendments. 
Even if the Fifth Circuit was correct in its argument that the 
two amendments’ purposes differ, the court did not offer any 
justification—much less an argument grounded in stare decisis—
for why affirmative rights might generally have a more limited 
scope than protective rights.193 The Fifth Circuit failed to provide 
a reason for why this “affirmative right” to bear arms, although 
more narrow, does not extend to undocumented immigrants. 
                                                                                                     
 187. See id. (explaining the practical effects of the rights-based approach). 
 188. See id. at 444 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s characterization 
of the Second Amendment as an affirmative right is contradicted by Heller.”); 
see also McGee-Tubb, supra note 41, at 84 (laying out the contradicting 
precedent).  
 189. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008) (citing United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)).  
 190. McGee-Tubb, supra note 41, at 85.  
 191. See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 444 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s characterization of the Second 
Amendment as an affirmative right is contradicted by Heller.”).  
 192. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (noting similarities, rather than differences, 
between the three amendments discussed).  
 193. See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 441 (mentioning only that it is 
“reasonable” to think that protective rights extend to more persons than do 
affirmative rights).  
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Agreeing arguendo with the Fifth Circuit’s rights-based premise, 
it does not necessarily follow that the undocumented would be 
excluded from “the people” as a part of this narrower reading of 
the Second Amendment.  
The distinction that the Fifth Circuit concocted between the 
Second and Fourth Amendments is artificial, unclear, and 
misguided.194 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit’s attempt to construe “the 
people” of the Second Amendment as narrower than “the people” 
of the Fourth Amendment reflects, in one scholar’s words, “the 
unique undercurrent of gun rights as a symbol of belonging to 
America.”195 If courts continue to invent these arbitrary 
classifications as a means of narrowing the scope of “the people,” 
they will perpetuate judicial activism at the expense of 
well-defined precedent.196 Precedent does not support the Fifth 
Circuit panel’s analysis,197 and the court’s “strained reading” of 
the Second and Fourth Amendments has only served to further 
obscure the meaning of “the people.”198  
                                                                                                     
 194. See Eugene Volokh, The Constitutional Rights of Illegal Aliens, Under 
the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 13, 2011, 
6:01 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/06/13/the-constitutional-rights-of-illegal-
aliens-under-the-first-second-and-fourth-amendments/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2016) 
(noting that the court’s reasoning is “not sound”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review); see also Magliocca, supra note 36 
It may be that illegal aliens should get no protection from the Bill of 
Rights or less than what those who are lawfully here get, but I don’t 
see any support for the proposition that illegal aliens would, for 
example, get Fourth Amendment rights but no First or Second 
Amendment rights. 
McGee-Tubb, supra note 41, at 86 (describing the Fifth Circuit’s distinction 
between affirmative and protective rights as “unclear”).  
 195. Gulasekaram, supra note 42, at 622.  
 196. See McGee-Tubb, supra note 41, at 86–87 (explaining that the use of an 
unclear, ambiguous distinction such as the affirmative versus passive dichotomy 
welcomes judicial activism on the issue of alienage and the Second Amendment).  
 197. See id. at 86 (“The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion—that constitutional rights 
can be categorized and that this grouping can determine those to whom a right 
applies—would require abandoning the dominant understanding that the Bill of 
Rights serves both affirmative and protective purposes and would define 
constitutional rights more narrowly than ever before.”).  
 198. See Gulasekaram, supra note 42, at 623 (suggesting that the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to review the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Portillo-Munoz has 
prolonged confusion surrounding the scope of “the people”).  
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V. Recommendation to Resolve the Circuit Split 
A. The Meaning of “the People” Matters 
Gun ownership is a politically potent issue, and the question 
of who is sufficiently “American” to bear arms has become a 
divisive topic.199 Nevertheless, the issue of alienage and the 
Second Amendment has received surprisingly little attention in 
the courts until recently.200 Undocumented persons’ orientation to 
the Second Amendment and the Bill of Rights at large is 
profoundly important for three main reasons. 
First, the way that courts interpret “the people” in the 
Second Amendment necessarily affects the interpretation of “the 
people” currently protected by the First, Fourth, Ninth, and 
Tenth Amendments.201 Interpreting the scope of the Second 
Amendment narrowly to exclude undocumented persons 
threatens the current and more expansive interpretation of “the 
people” in other amendments.202 If, as argued here, courts have 
erred in their narrow interpretation of “the people” in the Second 
Amendment, then it is imperative to correct the interpretation 
before it infects the meaning of “the people” throughout the Bill of 
Rights to exclude undocumented persons from the First, Fourth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.203  
                                                                                                     
 199. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens with Guns: Equal Protection, 
Federal Power, and the Second Amendment, 92 IOWA L. REV. 891, 893–94 (2007) 
(“The marriage between firearms and America traces its roots to the country’s 
founding era . . . . Since that time, gun ownership has occupied a distinct 
position in the American popular, political, and legal landscape.”).  
 200. See id. at 893 (“In this era of increased attention to immigration, 
national security, and terrorism, often overlooked is a constitutional nexus 
where equal-protection principle, the federal foreign-affairs power, and the 
Second Amendment coalesce: alienage and the right to bear arms.”).  
 201. See Salnikova, supra note 39, at 626 (noting the importance of correctly 
defining “the people” of the Second Amendment because it necessarily informs 
the scope of other Bill of Rights guarantees).  
 202. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
symbiotic nature of “the people” throughout the Bill of Rights renders the 
interpretation of “the people” of the Second Amendment critical to the construal 
of the Bill of Rights generally).  
 203. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text (underscoring the 
importance of interpreting “the people” uniformly throughout the Bill of Rights 
to conceivably include undocumented persons).  
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Second, the prevailing interpretation of “the people” to 
exclude undocumented persons reflects the possibility that 
partisanship is shaping Second Amendment jurisprudence at the 
expense of consistent constitutional interpretation.204 In light of 
the tortured reasoning of the majority circuits,205 it is hard to 
deny the possibility “that something deeper than interpretive 
disagreement is bubbling beneath the surface in contests” over 
the scope of “the people” in the Second Amendment.206 Indeed, 
Harvard Law Professor Mark V. Tushnet has written that 
“[d]isagreements over the Second Amendment and its meaning 
are no longer fought on legal and policy grounds alone.”207 Rather, 
he submits that “disputes over gun policy have become deeply 
enmeshed in the culture wars” because “[t]he Second Amendment 
is one of the arenas in which we as Americans try to figure out 
who we are.”208 Another legal scholar has noted that the Fifth 
Circuit’s eagerness to read “the people” more narrowly in the 
Second Amendment than in the Fourth Amendment underscores 
“the unique undercurrent of gun rights as a symbol of belonging 
in America.”209 Simply put, the Fifth Circuit’s decision reflects a 
cultural feeling characterized by uneasiness at the possibility of 
extending gun rights to noncitizens.210 Regrettably, the Second 
Amendment has become ripe territory for political power plays.  
Constitutional jurisprudence governing the confluence of 
alienage and the Second Amendment is still in its nascent stages, 
                                                                                                     
 204. See infra notes 205–210 and accompanying text (explaining why such 
an inference is plausible).  
 205. See supra Part IV (arguing that federal circuits holding to the 
Restrictive View of “the people” have strained to reach that outcome).  
 206. See Gulasekaram, supra note 42, at 623 (noting an alternative 
explanation for the incongruity between the courts’ decisions and the actual 
meaning of “the people”).  
 207. MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END 
THE BATTLE OVER GUNS xiv (2007).  
 208. See id. (acknowledging the role that culture has played in shaping the 
contemporary conception of the Second Amendment).  
 209. See Gulasekaram, supra note 42, at 623 (explaining the cultural 
hesitancy to extend gun rights to undocumented persons).  
 210. See id. at 627 (“Portillo-Munoz makes explicit what many may find 
implicitly or silently disquieting about guns and noncitizens in our 
constitutional order—that there is just something unsettling about extending 
gun rights to those who are not full members of the American polity.”).  
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and it is critical to correct its trajectory now.211 Fortunately, hope 
remains that Second Amendment jurisprudence may be shaped 
by reasoned legal analysis rather than by unfettered allegiance to 
an arbitrary cultural undercurrent.212 Intellectual honesty should 
characterize interpretations of the Second Amendment, so that 
the judiciary may focus on what the Second Amendment truly 
means instead of how it may interpret the Second Amendment for 
its own political and cultural ends.213 By resolving this circuit 
split without regard for partisan perspectives or political 
consequences, courts may begin the process of restoring integrity 
to their Second Amendment jurisprudence.214  
Third, clarification of the meaning of “the people” is 
important in the context of constitutional challenges to the 
alien-in-possession statute.215 A successful constitutional 
challenge to § 922(g)(5) would demonstrate, as a threshold 
matter, that the Second Amendment protects unauthorized 
immigrants within the United States.216 If so, a reviewing court 
                                                                                                     
 211. See Moore, supra note 37, at 844 (stating that jurisprudence governing 
the application of the Second Amendment to noncitizens will evolve and take 
shape in the near future).  
 212. See infra Part V.B (explaining that the Seventh Circuit employed sound 
legal analysis to conclude that undocumented persons might qualify as “the 
people,” contingent on a showing of substantial connections to the United 
States).  
 213. See TUSHNET, supra note 207, at xix (“Like all battles in culture wars, 
then, the fights over the Second Amendment are really about something else—
not about what the Second Amendment means . . . but . . . about how we 
understand ourselves as Americans. And so the battle over the Second 
Amendment will continue.”); Gulasekaram, supra note 42, at 652 (“[We] remain 
only partially committed to the constitutional goal of equality, retreating from 
that vision when citizenship status becomes the dividing line and when 
distribution of our uniquely American ‘advantage’ is in question.”).  
 214. See infra Part V.B (discussing why a consistent interpretation of “the 
people” throughout the Bill of Rights is the superior interpretive approach).  
 215. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012) (providing in relevant part that 
undocumented persons may not possess firearms).  
 216. See, e.g., United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 
2011) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“Of course, whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) violates 
the Second Amendment is a separate question from whether Portillo-Munoz is 
part of ‘the people’ who have First, Second, and Fourth Amendment rights.”). If 
undocumented immigrants categorically do not qualify as “the people” for 
Second Amendment purposes, then the constitutionality of § 922(g)(5) is 
automatically settled. Id. In other words, even reviewing the statute under 
strict scrutiny would prove superfluous because Congress need not justify gun 
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must determine whether § 922(g)(5) represents a constitutional 
infringement on an undocumented immigrant’s Second 
Amendment rights.217 The Seventh Circuit’s holding in 
Meza-Rodriguez has potentially laid a more robust foundation for 
a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(5) because the initial 
question in that inquiry is no longer settled against 
undocumented immigrants.218 If the Seventh Circuit is on the 
right side of the legal argument, as this Note argues, then the 
stage is set for a more focused debate on the constitutionality of 
the alien-in-possession statute.219  
Finally, resolution of this issue is an important first step in 
restoring a semblance of clarity to the phrase “the people” in the 
general context of the Bill of Rights. In considering the Second 
Amendment specifically, resolution of this split would solve an 
important piece of the Second Amendment puzzle, one that has 
been shrouded in confusion for years.220 Resolving the circuit split 
in favor of the Seventh Circuit’s approach will restore consistency 
to the interpretation of “the people” throughout the Bill of 
Rights.221 
B. Interpret “the People” of the Second and Fourth Amendments 
Consistently 
This Note urges a resolution to the circuit split in favor of the 
Seventh Circuit. A consistent reading of “the people” in both the 
Second and Fourth Amendments makes sense for several 
                                                                                                     
regulations targeting persons who are members of a class that inherently lacks 
Second Amendment rights. Id.  
 217. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting 
that, if the regulation at issue burdens conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment, then the next step is to apply the appropriate level of scrutiny).  
 218. Due to the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Portillo-Munoz, undocumented 
immigrant defendants finally have a precedential leg on which to stand when 
challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(5).  
 219. See Moore, supra note 37, at 844 (noting that, although courts have 
consistently struck down challenges to the alien-in-possession statute, courts 
will continue to confront this issue).  
 220. See Gulasekaram, supra note 42, at 622 (“Recent Supreme Court cases 
have exacerbated confusion over the inclusiveness of the Second Amendment.”).  
 221. See infra Part V.B (arguing that a consistent interpretation of “the 
people” is best).  
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reasons. First, the terms are identical in both Amendments, and, 
unless there is a compelling reason for interpreting the terms 
differently, the same terms should be construed in the same 
way.222 The default position should be a consistent reading of “the 
people” throughout the Bill of Rights, which the Framers adopted 
as a package.223 There is no intellectually honest way to carve out 
a distinction in the scope of “the people” in the Bill of Rights.224 
Contrary to the affirmative versus protective rights dichotomy 
posited by the Fifth Circuit, Supreme Court precedent does not 
support the idea that “the people” of the Second Amendment 
represents a narrower right than the Fourth Amendment.225 As 
the Seventh Circuit keenly noted, “[a]n interpretation of the 
Second Amendment as consistent with the other amendments 
passed as part of the Bill of Rights has the advantage of treating 
identical phrasing in the same way.”226  
Second, there is no evidence in the Constitution’s text that 
the term “the people” should be interpreted in more than one 
way.227 To the contrary, the Court in both Heller and 
                                                                                                     
 222. See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 
(2007) (explaining that a standard principle of interpretation holds that 
“identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given 
the same meaning”). 
 223. See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(noting that references to “the people” in parts of the Constitution other than 
the Bill of Rights may have a different meaning because they appear in a 
different context, such as in reference to elections rather than individual rights).  
 224. See id. at 672 (“In the post-Heller world, where it is now clear that the 
Second Amendment right to bear arms is no second-class entitlement, we see no 
principled way to carve out the Second Amendment and say that the 
unauthorized (or maybe all noncitizens) are excluded.”); see also Parker v. 
District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (explaining that such 
disparate interpretations of “the people” does not square with the idea that the 
Bill of Rights should be construed uniformly); United States v. Emerson, 270 
F.3d 203, 227 (5th Cir. 2001) (“There is no evidence in the text of the Second 
Amendment, or any other part of the Constitution, that the words ‘the people’ 
have a different connotation within the Second Amendment than when 
employed elsewhere in the Constitution.”). 
 225. See supra Part IV.C (dispelling the Fifth Circuit’s rights-based 
approach as arbitrary and unsupported by relevant Supreme Court precedent); 
Parker, 478 F.3d at 381 (“Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently endorsed a 
uniform reading of ‘the people’ across the Bill of Rights.”).  
 226. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 670.  
 227. See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 227 (“In fact, the text of the Constitution, as a 
whole, strongly suggests that the words “the people” have precisely the same 
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Verdugo-Urquidez discussed the similarities between the First, 
Second, and Fourth Amendments.228 For example, the Court 
observed, “it has always been widely understood that the Second 
Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a 
pre-existing right.”229 More compelling, however, was the Court’s 
evident approval of the passage in Verdugo-Urquidez, which 
stated that “the people” is a term of art used in the same manner 
throughout the Bill of Rights.230 From the Court’s language, it is 
reasonable to infer that the First, Second, and Fourth 
Amendments protect the identical group of people.231  
Interpreting “the people” differently depending on the 
specific right would lead to a parade of horribles. To begin, it 
would violate a leading principle of interpretation, which provides 
that identical terms should be interpreted in an identical 
manner.232 Second, interpreting “the people” in the Second 
Amendment as a small subset of “the people” referred to in other 
Amendments would contradict the Supreme Court’s 
understanding of “the people” as described in 
                                                                                                     
meaning within the Second Amendment as without.”).  
 228. See The Meaning(s) of “the People,” supra note 52, at 1088 
(“Verdugo-Urquidez and Heller both suggest that ‘the people’ has a consistent 
meaning throughout the Constitution.”). 
 229. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).  
 230. See id. at 580 
[Its uses] suggest[] that ‘the people’ protected by [the First, Second, 
and Fourth Amendments], and to whom rights and powers are 
reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of 
persons who have . . . developed sufficient connection with this 
country to be considered part of that community.  
(quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)).  
 231. See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 669–70 (7th Cir. 
2015) (arguing that Heller, by quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 
affirmed that “the people” has the same meaning in the First, Second, and 
Fourth Amendments); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 444–45 
(5th Cir. 2011) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Supreme Court recognized in 
District of Columbia v. Heller . . . the same set of ‘people’ protected by the 
Second Amendment are also protected by the First and Fourth Amendments.”). 
 232. See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 
(2007) (underscoring the importance of giving the same meaning to identical 
phrases in the same body of law); Sorenson v. Sec’y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 
860 (1986) (noting that identical words, even when used in different parts of a 
statute or constitution, should be given the same meaning (citing Atlantic 
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932))).  
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Verdugo-Urquidez.233 Third, it would leave undocumented 
persons vulnerable to the arbitrary whims of the judiciary.234 For 
example, Judge Davila in Torres considered whether 
undocumented persons should be considered part of “the people” 
of the Second Amendment.235 He stated that the concept of 
categorically excluding undocumented persons is “troubling” and 
“unfair,” considering that the other important amendments do 
apply to that class of persons.236 Despite acknowledging the 
inconsistency and unfairness inherent in excluding 
undocumented persons from “the people,” Judge Davila concluded 
that the Second Amendment “doesn’t apply to undocumented 
individuals.”237 
The following excerpt from Judge Dennis’s dissenting opinion 
in Portillo-Munoz offers a poignant illustration of the harm 
caused by interpreting “the people” in disparate manners:  
There are countless persons throughout Texas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi, who, like Portillo-Munoz, work for employers, pay 
rent to landlords, and support their loved ones, but are 
unlawfully residing in the United States. The 
majority’s reasoning renders them vulnerable—to 
governmental intrusions on their homes and persons, as well 
as interference with their rights to assemble and petition the 
government for redress of grievances—with no recourse.238 
                                                                                                     
 233. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(“[W]e should not regard ‘the people’ in the Second Amendment as somehow 
restricted to a small subset of ‘the people’ meriting protection under the other 
Amendments’ use of that same term.” (citing United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990))).  
 234. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (explaining why an 
inconsistent interpretation of “the people” in the Bill or Rights welcomes 
arbitrary classifications for inclusion and exclusion).  
 235. See Transcript of Record at 15, United States v. Torres, 
CV-14-00255-EJD (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2015) (conducting the motion to dismiss 
proceedings under 922(g)(5)).  
 236. See id. at 15 (acknowledging the contradiction inherent to the 
constitutional jurisprudence governing the scope of “the people”).  
 237. See id. (“There’s a rational basis for the Second Amendment and 
troubling as it is, perhaps define that there is at least one amendment that 
doesn’t apply because of 922, doesn’t apply to undocumented individuals when 
all of the other important amendments do and there is somewhat of a—it’s not 
fair.”).  
 238. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(Dennis, J., dissenting). 
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Narrowing the meaning of “the people” in the Second Amendment 
has the effect, whether intended or not, of potentially nullifying 
other rights currently available to undocumented persons.239 If 
undocumented persons categorically do not qualify as “the people” 
for Second Amendment purposes, then the door is ajar to strip 
them of other Bill of Rights protections.240 Indeed, the Fifth 
Circuit panel in Portillo-Munoz specifically questioned whether 
persons illegally present in the United States should have Fourth 
Amendment rights.241 Even the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that 
excluding undocumented persons from “the people” would 
unjustifiably leave them at the mercy of “burglars and 
assailants.”242  
For the sake of consistent interpretation and preservation of 
the rights owed to noncitizens, “the people” must be given the 
same meaning “when used in the exact same phrase in the 
                                                                                                     
 239. See id. at 448 (“Because Portillo-Munoz has substantial connections 
with this country, and because the majority’s holding effectively nullifies the 
rights of countless others like him, I dissent from the majority’s dismissal of 
Portillo-Munoz’s Second Amendment claim.”).  
 240. See id. at 444–45 (“[T]he majority’s reasoning renders [persons like 
Portillo-Munoz] vulnerable—to governmental intrusions on their homes and 
persons, as well as interference with their rights to assemble and petition the 
government for redress of grievances—with no recourse.”); see also Magliocca, 
supra note 36 (“Since the term ‘people’ is also used in the First, Fourth, and 
Ninth Amendments, [the Portillo-Munoz] decision has sweeping implications.”); 
Moore, supra note 37, at 844 (“The jurisprudence surrounding whether and to 
what extent Second Amendment rights extend to aliens will thus continue to 
evolve and take shape in the coming years.”).  
 241. See Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440 (majority opinion) (“[N]either this 
court nor the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment extends to a 
native and citizen of another nation who entered and remained in the United 
States illegally.”); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU Foundation in Support 
of Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1–3, Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 
2011) (No. 11-10086) (“In rejecting Appellant’s claim, the majority panel opinion 
questions whether the Fourth Amendment, which also refers to the right of ‘the 
people,’ should apply to searches and seizures of a ‘native and citizen of another 
nation who entered and remained in the United States illegally.’”); Recent Case, 
supra note 38, at 841 (“[The court in Portillo-Munoz] inaccurately represents the 
unresolved nature of this issue to say that the Supreme Court has never held 
that the Fourth Amendment applies to undocumented immigrants.”).  
 242. See United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 
2012) (“If the right’s ‘central component,’ as interpreted by Heller, is to secure 
an individual’s ability to defend his home, business, or family (which often 
includes children who are American citizens), why exactly should all aliens who 
are not lawfully resident be left to the mercies of burglars and assailants?”). 
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contemporaneously submitted and ratified First and Fourth 
Amendments.”243 If the right to defend one’s home and family 
from thieves and murderers is as important as the right to defend 
one’s home and self from unreasonable government searches and 
seizures, then the Second Amendment—like the Fourth—must 
confer protection on undocumented persons.  
C. Apply Relevant Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence to 
Determine when One’s Connections to the United States Are 
Substantial 
For now, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez governs the interpretation of “the people” in a 
Fourth Amendment context.244 In Verdugo-Urquidez, the 
Supreme Court was willing to include undocumented persons 
who have chosen to accept some societal obligations as part of 
“the people” for purposes of invoking rights against government 
intrusions forbidden by the Fourth Amendment.245 “The people” 
of the Second and Fourth Amendments are indistinguishable.246 
It follows that undocumented persons should be considered part 
of “the people” if they possess “substantial connections” to the 
United States to be considered part of the national community.247 
This Note recommends that reviewing courts apply evolving 
Fourth Amendment case law—discussing and solidifying when an 
undocumented person’s connections are sufficiently substantial—
                                                                                                     
 243. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 227 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 244. See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(“At a minimum, Verdugo-Urquidez governs the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment to noncitizens.”).  
 245. See Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d at 1167–68 (“The [Verdugo-Urquidez] 
Court seemed unwilling to say that illegal aliens, who reside here voluntarily 
and who accept some social obligations, have no rights the government is bound 
to respect when, say, they protest a raid or detention.”)  
 246. See Christopher Chrisman, Note, Constitutional Structure and the 
Second Amendment: A Defense of the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 
43 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 449 (2001) (arguing that the Court’s holding in 
Verdugo-Urquidez is significant because it establishes that the principle that 
the uses of “the people” in the Bill or Rights are indistinguishable).  
 247. See supra Part V.B (explaining why a consistent interpretation of “the 
people” makes sense). 
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to similarly resolve undocumented persons’ constitutional 
challenges to the alien-in-possession statute. 
To be clear, use of the “substantial connections” test would 
neither categorically include nor exclude undocumented persons 
from “the people” of the Second Amendment. Rather, courts 
would determine, using the Verdugo-Urquidez substantial 
connections test, whether the particular undocumented person at 
issue demonstrated sufficient connections to the national 
community to qualify for inclusion in “the people.” Adoption of 
this case-by-case inquiry has the benefit of recognizing the 
diverse circumstances that undoubtedly surround undocumented 
persons present in the United States.  
The Seventh Circuit panel in Meza-Rodriguez correctly 
applied the Verdugo-Urquidez substantial connections analysis to 
Mariano Meza-Rodriguez.248 The court determined that 
Meza-Rodriguez had substantial connections to the United 
States.249 Since the age of four, he lived in Wisconsin and 
developed connections to this nation by regularly attending school 
in Milwaukee, building relationships, and working periodically in 
the U.S.250 The Seventh Circuit concluded that Meza-Rodriguez’s 
twenty years of voluntary residence in the United States clearly 
satisfied the requirements outlined in Verdugo-Urquidez.251  
Under a substantial connections analysis, Nicolas 
Carpio-Leon should have also qualified as part of “the people” 
protected by the Second Amendment. Nicolas voluntarily lived in 
Orangeburg, South Carolina, for more than thirteen years, held a 
steady job, and fathered three children in the U.S.252 
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit did not apply the substantial 
                                                                                                     
 248. See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(reasoning that it makes sense to apply the Verdugo-Urquidez standard to the 
facts of this case to determine whether the scope of “the people” covers 
Meza-Rodriguez).  
 249. See id. at 672 (concluding that Meza-Rodriguez satisfies the necessary 
criteria).  
 250. See id. at 671 (insisting that Meza-Rodriguez’s criminal record does 
render his substantial connections meaningless for purposes of the 
Verdugo-Urquidez analysis).  
 251. See id. (noting that Meza-Rodriguez’s connections are “much more than 
the connections our sister circuits have found to be adequate”).  
 252. See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 976 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(listing Nicolas’s connections to the United States).  
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connections analysis to Nicolas, concluding instead that 
undocumented immigrants categorically do not qualify as part of 
“the people.”253 Reviewing courts should reject the approach in 
Carpio-Leon and affirm the approach in Meza-Rodriguez. 
Importantly, consistent interpretation of “the people” does 
not mean ultimately that undocumented persons will 
automatically receive the full panoply of rights received by 
citizens. Rather, in the same way as noncitizens must prove 
“substantial connections” to the United States as a precondition 
for Fourth Amendment rights, the undocumented will receive less 
protection than citizens—undeniably part of “the people”—
because the undocumented who do not solidify themselves as part 
of the community will not be included in “the people.”254  
VI. Conclusion 
This Note proposes that courts interpret “the people” of the 
Second and Fourth Amendment in the same manner. Such an 
approach would confer Second Amendment protection on 
undocumented immigrants who voluntarily live in the United 
States and have developed substantial connections to our nation. 
A thorough approach to addressing threshold challenges to 
§ 922(g)(5) must articulate a comprehensive paradigm to 
determine inclusion in “the people” of the Second Amendment. To 
that end, this Note recommends that courts apply Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence to determine when a specific 
undocumented-immigrant defendant has sufficient connections 
for purposes of the Second Amendment. 
The trend to exclude categorically undocumented persons 
from “the people” of the Second Amendment underscores the 
“latent and mostly unvoiced-societal struggle” with non-citizen 
                                                                                                     
 253. See id. at 981 (explaining that, regardless of their connections to the 
nation, undocumented immigrants, due to their illegal entry into the nation, do 
not qualify as part of “the people”). 
 254. See Magliocca, supra note 36 
It may be that illegal aliens should get no protection from the Bill of 
Rights or less than what those who are lawfully here get, but I don’t 
see any support for the proposition that illegal aliens would, for 
example, get Fourth Amendment rights but no First or Second 
Amendment rights. 
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participation in the American polity.255 This troubling and 
unsubstantiated trend, if left unchecked, threatens to leave 
undocumented persons outside the scope of the First, Second, 
Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.256 A consistent 
interpretation of “the people” would safeguard the rights and 
protections bestowed on undocumented persons who—as part of 
“the people”—have developed sufficient connections to the 
national community, clarify the meaning of the phrase 
throughout the Bill of Rights, and dispel the dissonance in the 
constitutional jurisprudence governing guns and alienage. The 
inclusive approach to undocumented persons, taken by the 
Seventh Circuit, represents the correct approach. Through a 
proper interpretation of the Second Amendment’s scope, the 
judiciary will safeguard liberty for the entire gamut of “the 
people.”257  
                                                                                                     
 255. Gulasekaram, supra note 42, at 651–52.  
 256. See id. at 652 (“[B]oth this judicial ipse dixit and state statutory 
frameworks that employ alienage distinctions in gun laws appear to represent a 
troubling and undertheorized trend towards leaving immigrants outside the 
protection of our Constitution’s liberties and increasing the chasm between 
citizens and noncitizens without justification.”).  
 257.  See St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 
1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES app. D at 300 (1803)  
This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty . . . . The 
right of self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments it 
has been the study of rulers to confine this right within the narrowest 
limits possible. Wherever standing armies are kept up, and the right 
of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any colour or pretext 
whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on the 
brink of destruction.  
